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**The Warrior Strategic Culture – New Phenomenon in 21st Century Culture: A
Transformation in
Military Leadership in the American Military Experience (1960-2010)**

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
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation investigates American strategic culture in the Cold War and Post-Cold War period of 1960-2010 with a focus on identifying features of strategic culture that are diminished or have disappeared, those elements that remain, and what became the current features of American strategic culture which I've titled as the Warrior Strategic Culture. It moves forward from some important pre-conditions or established areas of study that seem natural to those interested in American military studies and strategic studies as a whole. Scholars of international relations and security studies seek to understand why nations behave the way they do towards others, and in doing so rely upon established theories regarding international relations. When examining security or strategic studies in relation to other areas of national power, four areas of study have proven useful. They are known as DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic). I assert that strategic culture is an area that has a role in strategic studies, security, and international relations specifically. Related areas of research and studies, the connections between culture and how a people approach the military and conflict have a history at least as far back as Thucydides and his writings regarding the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides & Strassler Ed., 2008). It was, however, the Cold-War period and the decade of the 1970s before identifying or categorizing that connection became solid or direct. It is now identified in theory and work as "strategic culture."

To recognize the parameters of this work and research, strategic culture, more specifically American strategic culture, has a place or role in understanding the United States politically, culturally, historically, socially – a solid role that meets the spirit and intent of American studies. In the American system of governance, the overall desires of the electorate, or at least the voting public, are expressed in the politician selected to fill positions of responsibility and lead – decision-makers. A primary responsibility of those leaders is set forth in the Constitution: it is the security of the people – national defense. Those decisions are influenced by the voters, and of course in the American system where public opinion is influential, those who may potentially vote in the next election. Leaders and politicians look for the political will and feelings of the people. How the public feels regarding defense, conflict, and the military then guide preparatory decisions and direction, as well as influence (to some degree) the paths chosen during conflict or actions and missions regarding the military. Some elements from the past shape what the electorate believes regarding the military and conflict.

Those familiar with American history recognize the influence standing armies had upon American attitudes toward the military. The results are, from the perspective of most military historians, very clear. Immigrants leaving the old world for American shores were leery of standing Armies that carried out repressive, and some might say state-directed, terror against dissenting political views and minority faiths. However, with few exceptions, such as the Quakers or later the Amish, few immigrants or groups of immigrants in like faiths or social beliefs arriving in what became the United States were negatively disposed toward a requirement of able-bodied men to defend settlements or homesteads within recognized borders - a militia. Regardless of the record of effectiveness, a preference or reliance upon militias were part of our strategic culture. With little need to cross borders and no inclination to cross seas for military forays, our people and our leaders/politicians had little incentive to seek expansive or large standing forces. So, one could say that isolationism was largely a feature of our view towards international relations, but also influencing our preparations militarily and reinforcing the adequacy of the small regular force and militia.

Some military historians are clear in pointing out that our free market capitalism, our search for wealth and economic success within our own well provided environment, influenced our limited focus on military matters and provided greater impetus for the rapid demobilization and “gutting” of the military once a conflict or crisis abated (Bacevich, 2013; Millet, Maslowski & Fies, 2012). This desire to rapidly reduce military expenditures and manpower to a point where preparedness for emergencies or contingencies suffered seemed to be the paradigm that appeared again even in the late twentieth century. I believe this paradigm is still having a role in our current strategic culture, but with a caveat that differentiates the current from the past and poses a considerable threat in how we react to our world today. So, in another field of cross studies, the economy was and remains connected to strategy in the grand fashion, and in the micro-level of recruiting the force necessary to meet the objectives defined by our leaders (Scott, 2019).

Music, literature, television and movies, speeches all elements of our popular culture have both reflected our outlook regarding the military and conflict as well as being influencers of what was changing. As generations of older citizens relinquished the louder voice to new generations and the collective identity regarding the military and conflict made shifts, the television shows and articles in popular magazines accompanied and either subtly, or not so, advocated change. The United States is a large nation, not only in size and population but in the variations of its people. Although elements

of some accepted notions, beliefs, and outlook remain, the dynamic nature of its people with their varied beliefs and practices easily creates conditions for swifter changes regarding a collective identity or character.

Problem Statement

Strategic culture remains within the discourse of strategic studies, but there is little beyond the work of Mahnken (2006, 2009) and Harris (2014) and no evidence of yeoman work in posturing a comparative examination of what our strategic culture was vs. what it currently is. There is a dearth of work addressing the topic and certainly a lack of engagement regarding American strategic culture in an era where all aspects of strategic studies would beg attention. Existing literature fails to offer connections between popular beliefs and declared or demonstrated policies toward defense and conflict within the past five decades. The obviously changed landscape of American society, diminished influence of previous generations, and the passed leadership torch during a different international environment have received little attention.

Goals of the Research

1. Establish validity or counter argue the theorized hallmarks of American strategic culture in the period of the Cold War beginning in the 1960s.
2. Identify influencers of American strategic culture in the Cold War, later Cold War, and Post-Cold War periods.
3. Find seams and declare points of change in American strategic culture between the Cold War, later Cold War, and Post-Cold War periods.
4. Recognize those discarded and irrelevant features of American strategic culture from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War.
5. Identify the current strategic culture of the United States.

The theoretical framework of the research is based upon both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources include scholarly books in the field of defense, strategic studies, sociology, cultural studies, international relations, and American history. I also used professional journals related to the military, as well as academic journals.

Primary sources include period news articles, editorials, popular magazines, doctrine, government publications, speeches, political party platforms of specific periods, as well as period music and popular entertainment.

Research Questions

1. What is American strategic culture, and what are its features?
2. What are the limits of continuity in American strategic culture; where are the seams of transition, and what are the variables that changed the course?
3. What are no longer features of American strategic culture?

Hypothesis

Current strategic culture in America retains some features adapted from previous generations but also reflects changes inherent in a large, dynamic, and diverse nation. Chief among these features is the acceptance that conflict can and will be appropriately addressed by a minority pseudo caste of volunteers – essentially removing the classical notion of citizenship requiring military service.

Research Methods

While this research has mixed features, it is, by virtue of the subject, heavily qualitative. Culture, and particularly culture as it relates to matters of the military, conflict, and strife, does not, in the United States, present measures in the frequency it could were we looking at determining norms in clothing, hobbies, even family relationships. Interpretation of how feelings and beliefs by different generations were expressed in various ways through editorials, speeches, and newspapers, was important.

Content analysis, particularly keyword searches in the above-mentioned sources as well as doctrine and military professional journals, were helpful in recognizing the shifts from language, which was heavy in shared hardship and soldiering, to the more frequently occurring language of warriors and individuals. This method was also employed in the study of the recruiting years and phases following the end of the draft and the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF).

Some statistical analysis in the dissertation is applied in the online survey results from two sizeable sampling populations. In addition to a random civilian sample group, a similar survey was used with

a military sample population, and those results are explained in the last of Chapter 3 and can be examined in detail within the Appendices. Additionally, interviews among a smaller audience of retired military officers, with more open questions, added some depth and reinforcement to defining the seams and change points between the periods examined.

Methodology

Strategic studies have been largely the domain of the realist, whereas policy, particularly American policy, primarily harkened to the liberalist approach. Scholars of strategic studies examined state behavior through a lens that focused more on interest and power. States behaved large based upon what was best for them and what afforded them the most influence and strength or power. The world stage seemed to provide supporting evidence and environment for this theory through the Cold War. Some scholars examining the larger area of foreign policy as a whole have leaned upon liberalism as the most appropriate fit for explaining United States interaction and behavior in the world. They assert that the United States largely behaved in cooperative ways, consistent in minimizing conflict and solving issues or mitigating friction. Both scopes of theory are wide and have greater dependence upon influences from outside a state. But the end of the Cold War dampened the strategic lock on realism and had many looking for a peaceful world where there was less reliance on power to understand the globe (Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray, 2017). Strategic culture theory, of the original variety and first-generation, postured by scholars like Snyder and Gray, seemed to provide the historical underpinning for how the superpowers and lesser powers were likely to behave in the future. Jack Snyder asserted the behavior of the Soviets was strongly influenced by experiences from their past (Snyder, 77; Johnston, 1995).

I could not approach this research from that limited perspective of what American strategic culture means. The United States is too diverse, large, and dynamic to permit a less fluid and more deterministic direction of exploration. So, the threads you will see woven through this research are more in line with a constructivist approach.

Strategic culture is always present through the cycle of conflict, peace, preparation, then return to conflict that is repeated throughout much of American history. It is a mixture of material and ideational features, some more static and influential in the long term than others, reacting to influencers and variables that appear along the timeline. A useful construct for examining American strategic culture

is the Clausewitzian trinity.¹ It changes and adjust, if even only slightly, from the school of realism and demonstrated military action. It contributes to and buttresses much about the liberal school and the politicians who defend what Richard Hofstadter referred to as the “central faith” or consensus of economic individualism and private enterprise (Serby, n.d.). But this research identifies American strategic culture being closest to constructivism.

Novelty

Strategic culture received much academic attention in the latter days of the Cold War as scholars in strategic studies and international relations believed more doors were yet to be opened in describing and explaining the bipolar world that was the center of most explorations in the field. Culture is a difficult topic to deal with and was unwieldy in even the earliest discussions of its use and merit in explaining great and lesser power behaviors in matters of the military and conflict (Bloomfield, 2012)

The novelty of this research is that first, it expands the discussion of or efforts to answer key questions concerning what strategic culture really is and from whence does it come. The most attributed and cited works used by academia in the classrooms and in peer-evaluated works still acknowledge the influence of strategic culture as a field of study but continue to bemoan the difficulties in examining it. Strategic culture requires less concrete and often argumentative analysis of citizen's words, passions, expression, and intent. This research is the first to go beyond the academic jargon, and handwringing about American strategic culture found in the journals and does an examination of those difficult and sticky areas mentioned above. My research defies a more recent trend among scholars willing to address strategic culture who claim that it is defined and declared by elites.

Succinctly, my research finds and asserts points or seams where change occurs, as well as sources or influencers of change in American strategic culture, and identifies what I find to be the current strategic culture. The best label of our current American strategic culture I see as the term exuberantly applied to that shrinking minority or caste of Americans who choose to be engaged in the execution of conflict or in operations other than war – it is a warrior strategic culture.

¹ The Clausewitz “remarkable trinity” appears in his seminal work “On War” and refers to three forces that are the essence of war. In shorthand, they are (1) primordial violence, (2) play of chance and probability, and (3) policy or politics. Many scholars assert these three forces are concerned with people, army, and government. The construct of the trinity is useful in examining strategic culture. I address this in part 3 of the dissertation.

Practical and Theoretical Value

The practical value of this research is in what it offers decision makers or policy planners in recognizing where strategic culture comes from and what strategic culture is related to the United States. More importantly, this research may cause the previously mentioned decision-makers to question how radical the ideas and discussions occurring among leaders are, regarding force and conflict, and if they stray from what the culture will tolerate. The 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrated, if not ignorance, then a decision to ignore or weakly justify an action that countered some elements of American strategic culture. In contrast, the developing enemy, as well as the internal political opposition, recognized the friction and capitalized upon it.

Theoretically, this research deepens the consideration of change factors and influencers to strategic culture and offers a conceptualization over time for explaining strategic culture. This research is a response, or partial response, to calls from within the strategic studies community of scholars seeking deeper consideration of those indicators, proofs of strategic culture outside of or more than the obvious realm of resulting behaviors – the causality consideration (Johnson, 2006).

Limitations

This research mentions sub-cultures like those of the military, but other than a recognition of their influence does not investigate it deeply. An observation made by several scholars of strategic culture is that an influencer of the overall collective culture are the military sub-cultures. My research does not seek to condone or disprove the latter observation.

This research covers an extensive period of time with the intent of pointing-out the change agents and shifts in focus regarding strategic culture over that period of time. A more focused examination of the seams and benchmarks within limited blocks of time, with access to other sources not available here, may enable an even better assessment of American strategic culture.

Structure of the Dissertation Work

The dissertation is structured in the following way: introduction, three chapters, conclusion, references, and appendices. Appendices contain both sets of online surveys and interview questions.

CHAPTER 1 - Reductionist Examination of Warrior Strategic Culture and the Theory of Strategic Culture

The first part of the dissertation examines both literature and theory related to the term warrior strategic culture. The methodology for the examination is to deconstruct and examine the parts of the whole term as clarification and support for the outcome of the dissertation. The first review is of the term culture. Culture plays an important role in my research as a continuum, it is what is depicted in a figure later as a stream that accepts influences or contributors, but at any one time can be sampled to reflect what features are revealing themselves at that moment. This research identifies what I recognize as the meaning of culture and eliminates meanings not connected. Two authors recognized as important figures in work related to culture, Tylor, and Geertz, are identified and examined.

Strategic is the next area also examined through the research. Strategic is the larger or all-encompassing level of consideration and planning which can be and is applied in a number of fields or endeavors, not just limited to the military, although it had its roots, according to Beatrice Heuser, in the Greek word ‘strategia’ or “strategike’ that might have referred to a ruse or deception, but also probably to ‘the art of generalship’ (Heuser, pg 17 from Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray, 2017).

The military use or meaning is, of course, about the level of war involving elements of power at the national or state level. Students at the various war colleges examine national power and the strategic reach of all assets, they consider diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements as tools for acting and planning strategically, hence the acronym DIME. In the last forty-plus years, military education has increased its focus on pointing out the connections necessary to understand between strategic aims and objectives and the soldiers and leaders at the tactical level. The military doctrine related to strategy is referenced and useful in my research.

A contributing work to several areas, but worthy of first mention here is Thucydides. Among writers and historians whose work is used extensively in higher-level professional military education, Thucydides’ writings on the Peloponnesian War are significant for my research in that they consider a warrior culture of land strength and the strategic environment as they faced a naval power and culture with a more liberal focus. The dissertation recognizes Clausewitz and Gray as figures which frequently appear in this work.

My research further examines the use of the term “warrior.” The use of this term really can generate both angst or nostalgia, depending upon the audience. This term is a key component of my thesis, and the word is thrown around easily, in the contemporary environment, for a number of reasons. I examine the idea or concept of warriors born vs. the warrior made and use several examples.

The literature points out that the use of the term “warrior” has a troublesome nature to it for many. A Vietnam veteran, Arthur Varanelli, suggests that “encouraging the Warrior concept among soldiers can only exacerbate the gap between soldiers and society.” (2010) He is concerned about the construct of a “warrior class.” Several opposed to the term warrior are examined.

The research points out that the major use of the term in doctrine, everyday usage, and in recruiting began in the waning days of the Cold War and heightened during the growth of American involvement in operations other than war and the surge following 9-11. This is a supporting factor in the thesis and title of the dissertation.

Christopher Coker and Rune Henriksen contributed two works that received acknowledgment in the dissertation. In the first work, Coker’s main premise is that changes in the Western approach to war, largely with technological advances, but also in how war is perceived, have diminished the classical understanding of warriors – those who wage it, but also a diminishing of the realization of the brutality that is war. Shannon French addresses positive attributes that can or should infuse our military – attributes and behaviors she asserts are particularly important in the “war on terror.”

The professional literature in the last forty years, particularly with the Army, and most often within the Combat Arms branches, is rich with references to the soldier as warriors. The first chapter of the dissertation recognizes this.

Another important aspect of the literature review was the examination of warrior cultures and sub-cultures. With the title and theme of the dissertation de-constructed, it is appropriate to examine how the components can come together and fit within the framework of the research. The research examined the literature related to the Spartans, Samurai, and Scots. These groups, cultures, and a sub-culture, generally demonstrated traditions, practices, and values that helped differentiate them uniquely from others around them – as the Spartans were different from the Athenians. These unique features were contributing factors to their martial success and contributed to our comfort applying the term “warrior” in front of culture when we refer to them.

Strategic culture, the genesis concept of the research focus is also addressed early in the dissertation. Although hints, elements, or similarities of strategic culture can be found as far back as Thucydides, alluded to Clausewitz and indirectly addressed in B.H. Liddel Hart's work, the first contemporary mention of the term – where it enters the lexicon of strategic studies, was in the 1970s. The research identifies several prominent strategic culture scholars and their primary themes.

Another literature consideration addressed in the research were official documents that revealed language linked to American strategic culture, and particularly that of a change to a warrior strategic culture. One of the challenges of this undertaking is that strategic level documents and declarations of direction for a nation are by nature, generally and largely “vanilla” or flavorless documents that can be consumed safely at the citizen, or international level.

CHAPTER 2 - Strategic Culture Challenged or Accepted and American Cold War Strategic Culture

For the second chapter, the research moves into a consideration of strategic culture as a valid concept in the case of the United States as well as an examination of strategic culture in the early to late cold war years.

The research looked first for the strength or weakness of the strategic culture concept or theory and then for validating evidence identifying its features through the early to later stages of the Cold War. The research corroborated America does have a strategic culture, and in the Cold War period that culture is summarized with two or three features: a crusading zeal based upon a rightness of purpose and American exceptionalism, and a compound feature I refer to as “fast, frugal and survivable,” and lastly the feature of soldiers and service in the military for defense. The questions I sought answers to, for confirmation or denial of my hypothesis, were first, what were features of American strategic culture through the Cold War period? And second, does sufficient evidence exist to validate those features?

The dissertation refutes the claim of one particular American scholar who discounts consideration of strategic culture. Antulio Echevarria states, “if strategic culture is likened to the glue that holds patterns together, then interpretations of American strategic culture lack the power to adhere” (Echevarria, 2014).

In this chapter, the research also deals with one of the more common difficulties of examining strategic culture, and that is the semantics. Often “ways of war,” a notable portion of the title to Russel Weigley’s important book, although connected, is or is not the same as strategic culture. What actually entails strategic culture is emphasized.

In this chapter of the dissertation, identification of former features of American strategic culture is examined. While not proof of the present strategic culture, it is helpful to examine what were once features of strategic culture but disappeared or remained of such limited belief or expression to render them impotent.

Rising to high importance in American strategic culture and very strong with the arrival of the Cold War was the belief or drive to crusade – that American exceptionalism lifted the United States to greater levels of obligation and authority becomes a strong feature of American strategic culture. Another feature of American strategic culture, that rises and becomes even more visible in the third part of the research, is what is referred to as “Fast, Frugal and Survivable.” One might otherwise refer to this as an American expectation for speed, economy of force, and low or no casualties.

Introduced in this area of the research is the concept of American uniqueness when determining or examining strategic culture. The size, diversity, and rapidly changing demographics have influenced the change and shift process for the United States, perhaps greater than in any other nation.

This chapter of the dissertation contains the analysis of sampling newspaper editorials and opinion pages and popular news magazines in two watershed periods of the Cold War – post-Cuban Missile Crisis and post-Vietnam high water mark of American involvement.

The research examines external features that supported or buttressed the American posture in Vietnam or Southeast Asia (as well as elsewhere) preceding the advisor period and almost until the American combat involvement build-up in 1965. The first of these factors was the economic prosperity and growth.

The actions of the Soviet Union and its leadership around the globe and in its dealings with the United States were depicting a very black and white picture for Americans to latch onto. Americans had their purpose and a crusade focus upon, and television was an important tool in enabling this.

The research then includes a case study about Vietnam and the strip of time where much changed about the United States, and the perception or beliefs about service in the military were forever altered.

CHAPTER 3 - Landscape, Changes, and Implications of American Strategic Culture in the Latter days of the Cold War through the Post-Cold War

The third chapter of the dissertation examines the late and post-Cold War period. Vietnam and the immediate post-Vietnam period of social unrest in the United States presented fertile ground for shifts in how the public viewed conflict and the military – the strategic culture. The Reagan era ushered in a renaissance of patriotic and conservative feelings, and the once bitter and dissatisfied generation that both fought and protested the war in Vietnam welcomed some return to a more predictable and stronger America. Recruiting advertisements are recognized as an indicator of strategic culture.

The research reveals that in the Reagan period, there is evidence of what we might say is the beginning of a military caste. Americans were becoming very comfortable that while the gate or entrance is very large, allowing most who wish to enter the opportunity. Americans demonstrated that as long as the threat was contained and military strength was at or near what some experts say was acceptable, the public could feel content. Without investing blood - only coin, the majority of the public is doing their part.

This chapter of the dissertation also includes a case study on the Grenada operation or Operation Urgent Fury. Grenada, or Operation Urgent Fury, was the first mission within or during the shifting strategic culture of America.

The research examines the impact of the First Gulf War as a validation of the shifts which occurred in the military and the strategic culture. In the eyes of most Americans, the AVF was competent, prepared, and performed well. Smaller, and therefore cheaper, was the overall movement that nicely matched the facade of new world order. Americans could return to pursue what Americans loved best – a stronger economy and more comfortable life.

The American crusading spirit lessened from the Cold War period and became, for a time, more of a cautious and guarded willingness to assist. This comfortably merged with the exuberance felt after banishing the Vietnam demon.

The research recognizes President Clinton's guarded commitment of American military might as an adept reading of the solidifying strategic culture. Clinton's azimuth for the military focus would steer


the United States clear of several potential danger spots for “boots on the ground,” but his best efforts were not enough to squelch a determined network of Islamic extremists.

The waning years of the 20th century saw an increase in terrorist actions against the United States from Islamic extremists. The attempted destruction of the World Trade Center in 1993 pre-sagged terrible events to come. As the research points out, George W. Bush was in transition to a lighter and more technically reliant military when the September 2001 terrorist attacks changed so much. The attacks on September 11, 2001, amplified existing features of American strategic culture, a warrior strategic culture. Despite some manpower worries and concerns at the peak of involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously, the resiliency of the AVF was validated for many.

CONCLUSION

The research then reveals the survey and interview methods among three audiences. Structured interview questions were prepared and provided to nine mid-level and senior-level officers. Their responses were analyzed, and results offered that support key concepts of my thesis. Two audiences conducted online surveys. One group were military members recruited through screened social media membership; the other group was civilians meeting specific age criteria. From these surveys, the civilian respondents confirmed all but one of my assertions regarding the warrior strategic culture. Civilian respondents verified what at least one other poll from referenced material suggest, which is that civilians are not as unusually casualty averse as suspected. What the survey results from the military respondents suggested was that they (the military) believe civilians are inordinately casualty adverse.

This research dispels the assertion that change occurs only with catastrophe. This is the case with the United States. The results of this research are in keeping with thoughts or expressions by Johnston in 1995 and Gray in 1999, but it is unique in that no one has applied or sought the explanation of countering the durability position as it relates to the United States. There is a depiction provided, which (seen in the figure below) provides some illustration to the summary of my research and engagement of research questions.



As I maneuvered through the existing scholarly contributions on strategic culture, as well as examined what military and foreign policy historians asserted were features of American strategic culture, I determined one of the great tools was missing. I thus created a table (seen in Figure 2 below) to recognize in one place what my research asserts have been and are features of American strategic culture and some criteria for understanding. Three features are largely gone from the stream and are identified as isolationism, military service commonality, and a small standing army. Three others are later developments that exist today and are addressed throughout the research: crusaders, the combination of fast, frugal and low casualties, and finally, the warrior caste of the AVF.

Figure 2
Vanished, and Existing Features of American Strategic Culture

FEATURE	REASON	EVIDENCE	CHANGE AGENTS/VARIABLES
Isolationism	Geography Exceptionalism Political legacy	Statements Policy	Technology Cold War Generational
Military Service Duty Commonality	WWII Cold War	Statements Organizations	Vietnam Gates Commission Generational
Crusaders	WWII Cold War GWOT	Statements Platforms Conflicts	
Small Standing Army	Historical Requirements Isolationism	Mobilization	WWII Cold War
Fast, Frugal, Low Casualties	Vietnam	Statements Govt Doc Adjustment Decisions	
AVF Low % of Population – Warrior Caste	End of Draft Vietnam	Statements Doctrine	

Already cited as an important influence in this research in the first part of this dissertation is Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz remains important regarding a key element of my research focus and a portion of the title of the dissertation - strategy.

Clausewitz's trinity connections to strategic culture can be seen superficially with the passion and people clearly linked to culture. Clausewitz own words, drawn from the Howard and Paret translation, are this:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concern the

people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

A visual depiction of the trinity is often the pyramid or triangle, such as what we see in Figure 3.





Figure 3 – Clausewitz paradoxical trinity

The trinity is a useful construct for addressing the role of strategic culture, through the lens of what two scholars assert are the actor's vs the forces (Bassford & Villacres, 1995). As we saw earlier in the conclusion, strategic culture is similar to a flowing stream that people, events, history, geography contribute to. It is also conveyed or and passed on by citizens/people through action, voice, writing, and in the case of American representative government, the vote. Strategic culture sets a stage, but it may also serve as the shepherd's crook (See Figure 4).

One of the more oft quoted lines from Clausewitz is that war is a continuation of politics by other means. This would indicate that governments are the principle or main focus, whereas the other two forces or actors contribute or work in a subordinate manner. But this is a constrained view. A significant consideration is the role citizens within representative governments play, such as the United States federal republic type. This was not a factor in the world of Clausewitz. Strategic culture acts apart from the power and influence of passion, but also alongside it as an expression of the people who must themselves, or through the person of their sons and daughters, be the warriors.

In its role of setting or establishing conditions and a backdrop for how governments and militaries posture for military action, strategic culture in representative governments like the United States are providing the initial bumpers or parameters for government to establish or set policy (Clausewitz primary force). But a more inclusive consideration for strategic culture also accounts for the passion influencing adjustment decisions during conflict - the patriotic support or the shepherd's crook.



As a constant, the evidence or presence of strategic culture emanates out from the people and influences the recruiting; is woven into language of the military in doctrine; and influences politicians

who are the policy actors from Clausewitz's trinity. The military and government have, by virtue of being in the larger population of citizens, obviously influenced by strategic culture.

The use of America's military for missions of stability and operations other than war also seemed (at the beginning of a mission) to be in congruence with another feature combination – the fast, frugal, and low casualty preference in American strategic culture. To ensure that starving people are fed, borders are respected, or presence is felt, would be, by most appearances, the types of mission for Americans that would meet each component. The American public believed in these missions, and opinion polls indicated such. However, other factors had an impact.

The enemies in a conflict, or opponents in a struggle, always have a vote. Such was the case in these type of missions. Our opponents knew American strategic culture and worked to shatter American confidence that we could impose our will and accomplish our objectives. The real or threatened expenditure in casualties, cost, and time in operations that were not about defending home and hearth were the way for asymmetric groups, warlords, and aggressors to both outlive American involvement and largely succeed with their plans. But this was the external factor; there was an internal challenge.

The still lingering specter of Vietnam, the skeleton or ghost that so many people believed had finally been banished in the Winter of 1991, was a remaining influence on President Bill Clinton and a large number of his cabinet. Clinton himself had been an outspoken opponent of the war as a young man and looked for a way to avoid service through seeking admission to ROTC, then withdrew his intent there. As the progress of the war and the changing face of the draft went his way, his eventual high number in the lottery all but ensured he would not serve (PBS - Bill Clinton's Draft Letter, n.d.). While Clinton had succeeded through craft and luck to avoid the war, he lived and learned from the shattering troubles of the 60s and knew that political success would more likely follow a very circumscribed use of force (New York Times – Bill Clinton's Vietnam Test, 1992; Abbot, 2006). Assisting Clinton in navigating the difficult challenges of these type missions was another personality who was greatly influenced by Vietnam.

General Colin Powell also engaged American strategic culture in the 90s, having been on a different level of involvement regarding Vietnam. Powell served in Vietnam and was familiar with the dichotomy between the reality on the ground and the portrayal of the war at home. Like several other career officers who became Generals in the 80s and 90s, Powell sought both to improve the military

and do what he could to preclude the institutional and societal damage that the Vietnam War wrought on America and its military (Kitfield, 1995).

President Clinton and General Powell's reluctance or precision in committing the military during the nineties was in congruence with the American strategic culture. It matched Clinton's economic focus and the gradual retirement and withdrawal of the older statesmen and the committed age group of which Albright belonged continued the azimuth of less political and less average citizen investment in the military.

Another of the frequently debated and applied of Clausewitz's concepts is that of a center of gravity - *Schwerpunkt*. This concept is most often assigned the acronym of COG. The dissertation uses a COG analysis that utilizes the identified features of the warrior strategic culture.

As with several key concepts and passages from Clausewitz opus, the COG is drawn, circled, debated and becomes the focus of frustration in mid and senior level defense colleges throughout the western world, and it is because of that I deemed it important to consider in the conclusion of this research.

If we consider the current DOD definition of COG to be the guide, then strategic culture, the American Warrior strategic culture, the features of which I've identified in this research, would likely not be a COG, but instead, one or all might be considered critical vulnerabilities at the strategic level.

This research suggests that one feature (the compound feature of fast, frugal, and low in casualties) has been and likely will remain a vulnerability targeted by enemies of the West, but the United States specifically. This compound feature emerged slowly from Korea and becomes set after Vietnam. Fast Frugal and Low in casualties are targeted as a vulnerability by asymmetric threats from insurgencies, revolutions, and terrorists. By their nature, these type threats normally defy the conventional dominance of the United States or any other large power because of their ability to be fighters one moment and then blend back in with the populace, never seeking to engage directly, but fighting a protracted war (Mao, 1937). This then becomes, to use a figure of speech applied strategically, death by a thousand cuts (appropriately related – Lingchi, a Chinese method of torture). The United States, or the west, is psychologically and morally weakened by the draining cost of blood and coin.

In Figure 5 on page 20, the DOD and Joint Publication COG Analysis framework is applied to strategic culture. The COG itself matches the DOD definition accepted above. Strategically, the COG

may well be the will or support of the people. From this dissertation, we can examine several periods that are applicable here. JP 2-01.3 says the “critical capabilities are the crucial enablers for a COG to function and are essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective” (para. 4, pg. IV-12). In the case of Vietnam, the Johnson administration lost its political viability. In the Post-Cold War, President Clinton was an astute enough politician, programed by the trauma of Vietnam, to use the strategic culture to both avoid the traps and maintain viability. Recognizing exit signs following tragedy in Somalia and avoiding combat for ground troop commitment in the Balkans, Clinton largely dodged the intent of the nation’s enemies or potential enemies. “Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to be fully functional, and critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that that are vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results”, (para. 4, pg. IV-12).

While Americans are comfortable with a small percentage of the population being in the warrior caste, its feasibility in a two-front scenario was seriously questioned during the simultaneous execution of OIF and OEF. While it’s still unlikely that enemy pressure during operations not a direct threat to American homes and hearth would illicit a successful move to reinstate the draft, as I suggest in Figure 5, the pressure might be significant enough to deal with an effective indirect blow to public support for a counterinsurgency. Continuous deployments with short time between them as well as a phenomenal cost in caring for the wounded and traumatized in the warrior caste is a tremendous burden on a nation delighted with itself that so few need to serve.

Friendly strategic center of gravity in operations such as stability and counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism

Figure 5 – Center of Gravity analysis framework from Joint Publication 5-0 – Joint Planning, 2017

Strategic culture feature application is mine. Vulnerabilities correspond to inverse features of warrior strategic culture

Center of Gravity	Critical Capabilities
Support of the populace/Will of people	Political viability Continued operations International credibility
Critical Requirements	Critical Vulnerabilities
Strong polling results Budget approval and bipartisan progress related to conflict Unity Adequate troop or force levels Presence and solidarity in IOs	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> Coin – increasing fiscal cost Time – drawn-out, protracted conflict Lives – steady causation of casualties </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-top: 5px;"> Force adequacy – OP tempo high / dwell time low </div>
<i>Advantage with friendly forces only if swift, effective overwhelming force or assets can be applied and only modest casualties – collateral damage minimum</i>	<i>Natural, home-field advantage to enemy/insurgents/terrorist to execute long-game or long march. Protracted war with high cost in blood & coin, but sufficient and appropriate surge to create stress and doubt on force adequacy</i>

What seems increasingly likely is that unconventional enemies of the United States will target the strategic culture vulnerabilities. Facing off conventionally is too risky. Other enemies recognize the possibilities hybrid war present to take advantage of the weaknesses of American strategic culture while also being prepared to exploit opportunities more conducive to conventional forces, or criminal elements.

History demonstrates that this compound feature of fast, frugal, and low casualties’ strategic culture has limited impact in circumstances where the United States has suffered direct attacks. In general, the circumstances of the Second World War itself, and the resilience of the generations who fought in it and weathered it were accustomed to sacrifice, collective effort and discipline. While there was and will always be some demonstrations of war-weariness, there was less made of it in WWII when the binding and driving motivation of the attack on Pearl Harbor remained in people’s minds.

It is appropriate to address how strategic culture and what I assert is the warrior strategic culture, fits or applies to another heavily discussed concept or reality, which is hybrid warfare. This is the concept that states will and are using all tools or fashions of warfare, perhaps simultaneously, to not only destabilize and break the planning and analysis cycle of their enemy but to quickly identify the easiest

path or route toward damaging the opponent's center of gravity. engagement and the involvement of multiple players or agencies, as well as our own self-imposed legal or ethical limitations, stress our capacity to be in congruence with our strategic culture. defied the boxed and arranged hostility that our temperaments and our strategic culture are geared for.

Significant in this consideration is the manpower requirement to engage an enemy or enemies using so many varied paths. This can take us to a stress point where the operational tempo of our warrior caste is crippling and the diversion of assets can either grow the deficit as we try to buy our way to a solution such as increasing the size of the force , or borrow from one pool of money to aid another, also damaging in that someone or some program suffers from funding diversion. In some circles, the current immigration issues are considered as a developing path of attack that could fall in the hybrid war category. If a potential counter to the threat from unhindered illegal immigration is to build walls and increase the number of border patrol officers or national guardsmen to enforce compliance, then the effectiveness of the warrior caste is impacted and the difficulty in recruiting to the ranks of warriors increases. It is difficult to sell American citizens on the long-term threat imposed by illegal immigrants when the face of the threat is a hungry and poorly clothed child – the applicability to a crusade is hard to imagine.

This research confirmed much, but not absolutely all elements of my hypothesis. My examination of secondary research and in my original research, through interviews and surveys confirmed, from the military and civilian responses, that the public is largely disconnected from the military and when possible, seeking a fast and cheap resolution to military action. The still ongoing mission in Afghanistan is the exception to this, and the aberration is, I believe, a reflection of the 9-11 attack, which still resonates among the public as an attack on our soil by elements willing to kill innocents. Fast and cheap (or practicing economy of force) was the approach began by the Bush administration before 9-11 in the transformation effort, and this strategic culture driven policy was still influencing in the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Shanker, 2003; Gompert et al, 2014). As negative press revealed a flawed intelligence picture of WMD, the public and politicians pushed for withdrawal. As each of my research efforts confirmed, the factors of the crusading spirit and an abiding faith in technological prowess remained from the earlier days of the Cold War.

A segment of the research and hypothesis that remains unvalidated and deserves greater work for perhaps another research objective is the belief that the American public has become inordinately casualty averse. As I addressed and revealed from the survey results, what the military themselves sense, and what our enemies or potential foes believe (Moelter, 2002; Mahnken, 2006; Timeline: Messages from Bin Laden, n.d) contradicts what my own primary research revealed and what many scholars and policy analyst are saying.

While the scope of my hypothesis and research necessarily expanded my queries, questions were addressed, and some adjustments occurred. The first question regarding what American strategic culture is, through its features, has been addressed. Also, the research identified the points along the stream or timeline where the transition occurred, and the agents or variables that influenced the change occurred. Vietnam and the post-Vietnam reactions generated by the generational transformation from the survivors of the Great Depression and WWII relinquishing the greater influence to “Boomers” speak to this through the political pressure they asserted and military posture they accepted. But after successfully eliminating conscription, they then reversed a period of malaise with election of Ronald Reagan to finish the “Cold War” triumphantly. Our strategic culture was calling us to contribute if not lead the crusade, but to do it as quickly and as cheaply as possible

The responses to the final question are clear to see from where American strategic culture has arrived. American belief in isolation and a purely defensive orientation regarding conflict have never been solidly in place, but the Cold War and the Post-Cold War actions in keeping with the crusading zeal and belief in exceptionalism have largely pushed, rather than pulled America into engagements. The interconnectivity of the world, the elimination of the oceans as barriers, and the advent of the intercontinental missile and long-range aerial bombing fleets rendered isolationism as irrelevant. The trauma of 9-11 created a greater inclination to unilateral or limited collective action - preemptively if necessary.

The later generations of Americans appear to have shorter memories regarding events that cause a reaction in defense matters. As Bacevich (2013) and my interviews have suggested, the desire to return focus to making money and pursuing desires is primary.

This research has gone beyond what scholars in the field have attempted regarding American strategic culture and re-opens a topic or area of national security studies that cross into numerous academic disciplines: sociology, political science, history, and media/communication studies. My dissertation

challenges policymakers and military leaders to question the underlying influencers and motivators behind directions and policy regarding national security. This work questions those who assert that the influences of culture are minimal to decisions regarding war, or those decisions of a strategic nature, are only made by elites.

This research asserts that the United States' strategic culture has features (a “warrior strategic culture”) that warrant careful examination. Our performance in opening battles or engagements in past conflicts and operations other than war point have sometimes revealed a lax preparation and grasp of reality for some of the features of the warrior strategic culture. Should the next conflict be against a near-peer enemy who recognizes America’s warrior strategic culture vulnerabilities, the results of the opening battle(s) may be such that we find them hard to recover from.

Publications Related to the Dissertation

1. Scott, J. (2017). Scots in America. *Journal in Humanities*, 6(2), 45-49.
2. Scott, J. (2019). Who Serves? Recruiting in the Marketplace. *Journal in Humanities*, 7(2), 39-42.
3. Maisaia, V., Scott, J. (2018). Jihadist Hybrid War as Military Strategy for Aggressive Non-State Religious Actors – Main Characteristics and Doctrinal Implications of Modern Terrorist Organizations (Daesh, Taliban, and ‘Caucasus Islamic Emirate’ cases). *Ante Portas – Security Studies*, 11(2), 269-288.